EMPLOYMENT OF SEA POWER

[Music] [Music] foreign [Music] so [Music] so thus far we have considered the offensive type of warfare which we undertook against germany and italy from the time of our entry into world war ii [Music] in the pacific ocean phase of world war ii our fleet was greatly weakened by the japanese air attack on pearl harbor which brought us into the war this plus our concentration against the european axis obliged us to assume that defensive in the pacific the defensive seeks to thwart an enemy effort the purpose of a defensive is to gain time time to strengthen one's self or weaken the enemy in order to shift to the offensive a clearly inferior fleet as our pacific fleet was after the pearl harbor attack may be obliged to abandon the theater of operations we did not do this we were able to remain in the pacific because of our bases at dutch harbor pearl harbor and samoa and allied bases in new guinea and northern australia all backed by additional bases to their rear these bases enabled us to draw our first line against the japanese but we were still inferior we could not yet go on the offensive but we could dispute the enemy's command of the sea historically navies have disputed the enemy's command by fleet in being by suicide missions by raids on the enemy's communications and on his bases and by attacks on his isolated fleet units the united states navy could dispute japanese command of the sea by keeping the remains of our fleet in port as a fleet in being a threat and deterrent to further japanese advances we did not do this or we could dispute command by sending expendable forces in a suicide mission to slow down the enemy's advance and gain time we did this in the east indies in the java c campaign we could dispute the enemy's command of the sea by raiding his communications we did this by sending our submarines against the tankers and cargo vessels bringing oil and other vital war-making raw materials from the east indies to japan we could dispute his command by raiding his faces we did this sending carrier forces for air raids on the gilbert's and marshalls on marcus on rebel on lai and salamawa and on tokyo in the course of these operations our submarines and aircraft also attacked and sank a number of the enemy's fleet units by such measures we were purchasing time for our factories and shipyards and training schools to build up new forces to offset japanese superiority in the pacific at first it would have been folly for us to mass our forces in the pacific at one point for the enemy might have struck in force at another point and we should have lacked means even to delay him there while we assembled our strength against him but in the spring of 1942 we developed means of learning the enemy's plans this gave us the tremendous advantage of knowing where to place our forces in order to counter his next move we found out that he was about to strike in the south towards our most vulnerable line the communication line to australia and new zealand we therefore concentrated our available forces in the south in the ensuing battle of the coral sea we were able to concentrate our forces successfully against a superior enemy because the enemy was in two divisions and we got in between thus we had what is called an interior or central position we could strike first at one enemy force and then at the other before the enemy divisions could get around our position to mass strength against us we thus turn back the japanese advance in the south a month later the japanese struck at our center at midway but again with advanced information of his plans we concentrated at the center and met the enemy advance in the battle of midway here the japanese were imperfectly concentrated because their three forces were disposed in such a way that they could not quickly support one another they thus lacked coordination our carrier force sank all four of their lightly escorted heavy carriers before the main japanese force could protect them without sufficient air cover the japanese were obliged to retreat in these two battles coral sea and midway we had lost two carriers but the japanese had lost five we were still inferior to the japanese but strong enough to abandon the purely defenses where should we strike back the southwestern end of our vital communication line to australia and new zealand was the most vulnerable area in our defense this therefore was the strategic center the point where at that time a blow could most decisively affect the outcome of the war a counter stroke was necessary because our reconnaissance planes had discovered that the japanese were building an airstrip on guadalcanal preparatory to advancing against the american australian communication line therefore the united states marines supported by the pacific fleet invaded guadalcanal in august 1942 again we had achieved concentration against the enemy this time by sending our main force against part of his force while the enemy taken by surprise was not immediately able to concentrate his strength against us when he did come we had completed the airfield and had developed our forces sufficiently to throw him back the japanese now no longer dared thrust south east against our communication line for this would have left our new guadalcanal base are thwart his communication lines our capture of guadalcanal was an offensive defensive move because we were gaining control we did not already possess while seeking to thwart an enemy effort it was tactically offensive but strategically defensive following our capture of guadalcanal we made a year-long two-pronged drive to neutralize the japanese base at rabao the strategic center of japanese strength in the south in doing so we went beyond merely disputing japan's command of the sea we were securing command for ourselves we were securing command of the sea by sinking enemy ships we were securing command by downing enemy flames we were securing command by seizing strategically located bases by the end of 1943 we had so weakened the japanese navy especially by shooting down its carrier aviators that the enemy fleet was obliged to withdraw from the pacific until it could train more air crews it thus for a while became a mere fleet in being by this time we had completed building and had assembled at pearl harbor a great new fleet and amphibious force the new central pacific fleet with its striking power concentrated in the fast carrier task force in addition to the offensive we were already waging against our enemies in europe we could now launch an all-out offensive in the pacific our central pacific forces captured the gilberts the marshals the marianas whence army bombers could strike at japan and our submarines could increase their attacks on the enemy communication line from the east indies while our southern forces continued their advance this dual advance gave us the exterior position it was consistent with the requirements of concentration because each advancing arm was stronger than anything the enemy could send against it one arm would hold the enemy in one quarter while the second arm would strike in another quarter in the battle of the philippine sea june 1944 our central pacific forces defeated the japanese fleet sinking three carriers and stripping the others of planes [Music] at last in october 1944 both arms converged on the philippines from here we could completely block the vital japanese communication line from the east indies here however our forces fail to fulfill our requirement of concentration coordination of forces through unified command the central pacific fleet and the southwest pacific fleet had no overall unifying command nearer than washington in the battle for lady gulf in october 1944 the two fleets failed to coordinate in supporting the beachhead the southwest pacific fleet went south in pursuit of a minor enemy force the central pacific fleet went north after a decoy force of planeless carriers thus because our two fleets lacked unified command they failed to pursue a single objective and so failed to achieve mutual support coordination was lost this gave the main japanese fleet the chance to break through the center and strike at our unprotected beachhead on lady fortunately the japanese commander lost his courage and retreated without smashing the beach head but we had had a narrow escape through neglecting concentration the battle for lady golf destroyed the japanese fleet as a fighting force we thus finally secured command of the sea in the whole pacific for our communication lines were secure and we could easily intercept any ships flying the main japanese line we had now reached the point of exercising command of the sea freely sending supplies and reinforcements and expeditionary forces to capture new bases while the enemy could no longer use the sea during the re-conquest of the philippines our carrier planes carried out the naval mission of lending strategic support to our troops by smashing enemy air and naval bases on and around luzon with the recapture of luzon we had completed our chief naval objective from this base the main japanese communication line was completely blocked japan began to starve for want of oil and other strategic materials however to speed up the bombing of japan the navy in february 1945 captured iwo jima to provide a base whence fighter planes could accompany our marianas based bombers over japan in april 1945 we invaded okinawa chiefly to provide a staging base should invasion of japan be necessary in invading okinawa we fainted at the south east coast to hold the enemy in that quarter while we invaded without serious opposition in the west thus securing concentration during the okinawa campaign the japanese disputed our command of the sea by kamikaze attacks and by sending out the pitiful remnant of their fleet in a fruitless suicide mission but these defense measures could not affect the course of the war for the purpose of defense is to gain time and time was on our side the sea was now ours likewise the air over japan [Music] our fleet stayed on landing tactical as well as strategic support to the troops ashore from okinawa we could send planes to mine the harbors of japan thereby severing japanese communication lines from china and thus completing the blockade of japan under the starving stricture of the complete blockade coupled with incessant aerial bombing of her industries japan had no recourse but to surrender not long after the surrender of germany the navy had at length secured command of the sea over the entire area of both oceans thus carrying out its primary mission command of the sea means control of sea communications the phases of command are disputing command securing command exercising command the navy had also carried out other missions conducting amphibious operations [Music] and supporting forces ashore [Applause] [Music] [Music] to carry out these missions the navy had to destroy enemy forces on the sea over the sea and under the sea this it achieved by sound strategy backed by abundant natural resources and a skilled and industrious people the three elements which determined our strategy were communications the system of roots and transport positions where communication lines were vulnerable here we in our allies maintain bases and sent our naval forces to capture more bases in order to protect our communications and harass the enemies concentration which is bringing sufficient force under the right conditions to the right place concentration implies coordination of forces which requires unified command mutual support of forces and pursuit of a single objective concentration also implies concentric action which requires disposal of forces with regard to the strategic center the point where a blow can most decisively affect the outcome of a battle campaign or war concentration in short consists of coordinated concentric action it is directed against part of the enemy force while the enemy is held at all other points while we hit the enemy at one point we may hold him elsewhere by a double thrust as we did in the offensive phase of the pacific war by securing a central position as we did in the coral sea by surprise as we did at guadalcanal by faints or diversionary moves as we did at okinawa in selecting among objectives in warfare priority must be given to that objective which best contributes to the main decision on land on sea or in the air thus in the battle of the philippine sea admiral spruance refused to advance toward the enemy fleet until he was certain the beach head on saipan was secure because his best contribution at that time was to obtain a central pacific face for submarines and planes to the commander conduct of warfare is largely a matter of informed common sense know your enemy know your men and their capabilities know your weapons and their uses [Music] know your theater of operation know what actions are likely to lead to a decision you