BROKEN ARROW PROCEDURES
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Year Published: 1962
Format: 16mm
Description: This amazing 1962 U.S. Air Force training film BROKEN ARROW PROCEDURES shows the procedures used in an accident involving a nuclear weapon. In this case, a airborne B-52 has caught fire while carrying a nuclear weapon. The film was likely made in response to the Goldsboro incident of 1961, in which an atomic bomb survived an airplane crash and fire. It was one of the most terrifying moments in the history of the Air Force, SAC and the Cold War, since after the incident it was determined that most of the bomb's safety mechanisms had failed and, in a terrifying scenario, the device could have actually detonated. The incident led to a wholesale reappraisal of safety standards and serves as an enduring lesson to nations that have atomic weapons of the necessity of redundancy with these safety devices. The film suggests different scenarios, including a nuclear detonation, or a "dirty" fire that presents a hazard to personnel due to nuclear radiation, or a situation in which atomic material is spread over a large area by a crash. In these instances a full scale disaster response, including mass evacuation of personnel and civilians in the area, is needed. The film includes footage at the 13 minute mark of a B-52 making a hard landing on the runway and its gear collapsing. It also uses b&w footage of a military accident in 1959, with an airplane aflame and first responders arriving on the scene. The 1961 Goldsboro B-52 crash was an accident that occurred in Goldsboro, North Carolina, on January 24, 1961. A B-52 Stratofortress carrying two Mark 39 nuclear bombs broke up in mid-air, dropping its nuclear payload in the process. The pilot in command ordered the crew to eject, which they did at 9,000 feet (2,700 m). Five men successfully ejected or bailed out of the aircraft and landed safely. Another ejected but did not survive the landing, and two died in the crash. Controversy continues to surround the event as information newly declassified in 2013 reinforced long-held, public suspicions that one of the bombs came very close to detonating. In 2013, investigative journalist Eric Schlosser published a book, Command and Control, in which he presented a declassified 1969 document obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. In the report, entitled "Goldsboro Revisited," written by Parker F. Jones, a supervisor of nuclear safety at Sandia National Laboratories, Jones says that "one simple, dynamo-technology, low voltage switch stood between the United States and a major catastrophe," and concludes that "The MK 39 Mod 2 bomb did not possess adequate safety for the airborne alert role in the B-52."
Complete Record:
Transcription
e [Music] it can begin in many ways this might be one of them hyber VI approach control this is Blue Train 5 Harbor View Omni over Roger Blue Train 5 this is Harbor View approach control over Roger Harbor View Blue Train 5 holding Harbor View Omni 20,000 ft I have declared an emergency request immediate penetration to haror view Air Force pass to Harbor View Tower explosive cargo forward section of aircraft explosives become enveloped in Flames detonation may be expected after one five minutes six Personnel aboard five one half 5,000 Gall fuel remaining over Roger BL Blue Train 5 Harbor View altimeter 30001 cleared for Harbor View V LS penetration and approach to Harborview Air Force Base Landing Runway 36 left report leaving 20,000 over blue train 5 rer Tower approach Control Blue Train 5 B52 High station now declared an emergency explosive car go forward section of aircraft if explosive become veloped in Flames detonation may be expected after 1 five minutes six Souls on board 54 one a 5,000 gallon of fuel remaining this then is the emergency one involving a possible Hazard to nuclear weapons or material nickname potential Broken Arrow this is a potential Broken Arrow repeat potential Blue Train five a B52 holding over the Omni has now been cleared line he has had hydraulic troubles the gear now appears to be down and in place he has explosive cargo forward section of the aircraft explosives become involed in Flames detonation may be expected after 15 minutes six Personnel five forward one F 5,000 Gall of fuel remaining we have a class to emergency on a baker 52 Landing through 3 Blue Train 5 a B52 attention all responding apparatus we have a class to emergency on a baker 52 Landing 3 six left he has hazardous Cargo in his forward Bom Bay factor5 six Personnel on board five forward one out 5,000 gallons of fuel [Music] from this moment on success in meeting this threat to Personnel equipment and perhaps even to the alert posture of our forces depends on timely and adequate response but success isn't something you hope for it's something you plan for Blue Train five Harborview approach control T has been advised of explosive cargo Emergency Equipment is standing by over Roger har VI approach control this is train 5 leaving 20,000 now developing and maintaining the means to cope with accidents involving nuclear weapons on or off base is a requirement which must be met by commanders of major commands and Air Force installations guidelines have been laid down in Air Force regulations 55-14 and [Music] [Music] the Air Force to accomplish this is the purpose of this Motion Picture here right now the situation is this aircraft in distress nuclear weapon aboard the standby signal has been sounded emergency landing imminent but let's go back to a point in time when those responsible for coping with it were planning for just this kind of possibility they and you must recognize that for planning to be adequate it must be based on the worst possible disaster situation short of a nuclear detonation you must assume that the high explosive elements of the weapon May detonate and create a blast Hazard outward to a distance of 1500 ft flying debris may be blown in excess of 1500 ft breakup or burning of some nuclear components May produce an alpha contamination hazard in the immediate vicinity of the explosion and to some degree on the downwind side pieces of unexploded H may be littered about presenting an additional Hazard to Personnel if the accident occurs in or near a congested area personal injuries as well as major damage to adjacent buildings and aircraft can be expected base response to a broken arrow requires the coordinated effort of almost all base functions for this reason you must have wide representation on the planning team when there is an accident most of the planners become doers as members of the disaster control team at the disaster control command post as immediate response Personnel at the on scene control point and as support Personnel at the various control centers these three control elements are essential for successful Broken Arrow responses in the event of an off- based nuclear weapon accident the military or aec installation nearest the accident must assume immediate control this means that the disaster control team and others who cope with on base accidents are required at the scene the commander working with civilian agencies while coordinating base support maintains control until reliev by the commander having primary respons responsibility for the weapon The Authority civilian agencies can exert over the population lightens the Commander's burden but on base the commander alone is responsible for the control and Welfare of all segments of the base population the ability to control and protect depends mainly on the ability to pinpoint immediately the accident location when you plan consider all possibilities survey and Define all areas where accidents involving explosives are likely to occur during normal operations on a grid map of the installation designate these areas as explosive sectors usually these are the runways parking ramp alert area Munitions area Associated Transportation routes and at missile bases launch pad pads next establish withdrawal sectors a withdrawal sector includes the explosive sector and extends 1,500 ft from All Points along its boundary the boundary of each withdrawal sector should conform to known streets or markers this establishes permanent easily identifiable areas from which non-essential Personnel can withdraw Broken Arrow placards posted throughout the installation provide this and other information in ready reference form the building sector signals for standby and withdrawal withdrawal route assembly point or shelter areas and the direction of movement are predetermined to promote orderly and quick response if a broken arrow accident should occur in a location other than one of the designated explosive sectors Center the 1500t overlay over the location of each nuclear weapon and direct withdrawal accordingly since this is the exception you'll have to use means other than the standard withdrawal signal to alert Personnel in a heavily populated area for example a sufficient number of air police must be dispatched to evacuate adjacent buildings the importance of setting up a reliable Communications Network and establishing in reporting formats cannot be overemphasized this too must be accomplished in detail at the planning stage accurate and sufficient data is vital especially at the time of initial notification almost all decisions which will determine the degree of control must be made within the first few minutes of a broken arrow accident the commander must know what is happening exactly where when it began the effects what is being done and what ass system is required since notification can come from any number of sources personnel must be instructed to transmit information which can be acted upon the report might come from on base off base or from an Airborne Source but in all instances the tower and base operations have the responsibility of activating the initial response through an interlocking primary and secondary crash Network all concerned are armed with the facts on which preventative and support action can be taken these are the men concerned Professionals in their various Fields will work with and advise the commander on Broken Arrow procedures if and when required at this point they were only planning so let's assume that they have prepared themselves to cope with any eventuality including this one now taking [Music] place here an extremely serious situation is developing but there was time for a standby alert time to do everything that had to be done but don't ever expect time it's a luxury when it usually happens it happens fast that's the way you'll have to react command post this is Tower I have blue train five in sight now his approach appears normal all right [Music] [Applause] [Music] he's touching down [Music] now he landed very hard he's bouncing down the runway [Music] [Music] I think he has it under control now it appears to be under control a his gears collapsed he's veering off to the right of the runway the right wing is on fire run evacuate GCA heest respond to PR aircraft at kilo3 that's [Music] 20.3 control initiate broken procedure [Music] one power on Hospital on B Ops on we have a broken arrow on a baker 52 at coordinates K3 [Music] [Applause] [Music] d2.3 command post the accident is in sector Alpha grid coordinates the fire chief or unseen Commander is responsible for advising the command post of factors affecting the sounding of the withdrawal signal the signal to withdraw a non-essential Personnel is sounded as soon as fire is discovered in a weapon loaded aircraft or when a fire nearby seriously endangers a weapon [Music] your objective is to affect an orderly and prompt withdrawal when the base population is briefed beforehand on the measures taken for their safety you can expect a calm response non-essential Personnel proceed to designated shelter areas and remain there until the all clear is sounded all direct support Personnel check in at their assign shelters if the buildings in which they normally work provide good shelter use them the daily routine must be carried out if at all possible establish a Communications Network which includes the onene control point the disaster control command post job control and the other control centers through this Arrangement maintenance and support Personnel can be quickly dispatched to locations where their services are needed Broken Arrow placards are for the benefit of both essential and non-essential Personnel post them in all locations whether or not these locations are included in a withdrawal sector this provides visitors and those away from their normal Duty stations with the necessary withdrawal information when a broken arrow is declared much of what has to be done has to be done simultaneously this means coordination to an infinite degree but for the sake of clarity let's segregate the responsibilities of the main control elements during the initial response phase only those who provide direct support of or who assess support requirements are present at the scene this team is called the control nucleus consists of the onene commander the Unseen controller firefighting and medical personnel security forces and radiological and explosive ordinance disposal units an unseen control point is established near the scene of the accident to provide a location from which activities at the scene can be directed it is clearly marked by flag or sign and is a vital Communications link between the disaster control command post and unseen Personnel initially it is located 300 ft from the accident on the upwind side a mobile security Strike Team maintains circulation control into and out of the area by setting up a cordon and a single entry point the disaster control command post is the nerves Center during Broken Arrow responses it is the provider of support wherever and whenever it is needed it is the Clearing House for information information to provide a running account of events information which is relayed promptly to hire headquarters this checklist for an onbase accident is one of a number of displays you must have if your information is to be sufficient accurate and up to dat others are a base grid map with a 1500t [Music] overlay an off face grid map a list of personnel and alternates who comprise the Bas disaster control team including their on duty and off-duty telephone numbers and finally a list of all required reports submission time and the Staff Agency responsible for their submission unseen support requirements are sent to the disaster control command post and relayed to the individual control centers this ensures maximum coordination and control each Center controls its assigned radio equipped Vehicles dispatches personnel and equipment and reports all changes in its support capability to the disaster control Command Post each control center like PS control must have locally prepared checklists on and off Bas grid maps and a personnel roster of its disaster team and it must have established procedures which will enable it to carry out its responsibilities without hesitation in general here's what is transpired and is continuing at the various control centers the Munitions control center provides explosive ordinance disposal reconnaissance detection and [Music] Recovery Transportation Control Center provides additional Transportation as required maintenance control provides aircraft towing capability and Equipment removal teams it estimates aircraft equipment damage and keeps an accurate account of the aircraft and the new locations to which they have been moved in this way the operational status of the Tactical Unit is [Music] maintained the Fire Control Center provides firefighting support and make sure that firefighting Personnel are aware at all times of the location type and quantity of all hazardous cargo items items on base the damage control center manned by base civil engineering Personnel conducts damage assessment and assembles damage control Personnel these men are heavy equipment operators emergency standby generator technicians and [Music] Engineers their job is to carry out Reclamation projects and make emergency repair is control center is responsible for dispatching radiological [Music] monitors the central security control center supervises all law enforcement activities at the scene and throughout the base the hospital control center directs medical support for crash rescue operations and provides for the evacuation and treatment of casualties at the office of information control center the information officer is responsible for the prompt and proper handling of the press he prepares news releases that have the approval of the disaster team and the responsible Commander concerned in order to keep the public informed and to allay possible public apprehension newsmen are very familiar with the Air Force regulation governing their freedom on the scene of the accident make sure that all of your personnel involved in a broken arrow response are thoroughly brief on the rights and resp responsibilities of the newsmen as outlined in Air Force regulation 190-10 base operations one of the communications channels for the initial reporting of a broken arrow fills a supervisory function in regard to air drone control the tower serves as a control center to provide instructions to air Crews who are engaged in the movement of aircraft to Safe location and from his high vantage point the tower officer provides a running account of happenings at the scene to the disaster control command post these then are the men who in a concentrated allout effort are attempting to control this broken arrow accident should the fire become uncontrollable a non-nuclear explosion may be expected gr control is CH one the weapon is now engulfed in plan begin your countdown 104 Chief one Chief one crash control un now have 10 minutes the fire chief is continuously informed of the time remaining by his Fire Control Center from his knowledge of exactly when fire engulfed the weapon he has determined when the resultant explosion might occur CH one crash control you now have 1 minute Chief one crash control you now have 10 seconds 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 sign your air horns and Evacuate the area [Music] at 4 minutes before detonation the warning is sounded all response Personnel withdraw 1500 ft from the accident scene [Music] the Unseen Commander directs the withdrawal to a location which provides protection from flying debris and other hazards at this position the Unseen control point and radiological checkpoint is reestablished when withdrawal has been completed he advises the command post [Music] after an explosion has occurred or when it is determin that one is unlikely the Unseen Commander notifies the command post and Begins the re-entry [Music] phase he reestablishes the on scene control point at an upwind location when required which affords the best entrance to the accident area this is the only access point it is here that Personnel entering the area are briefed and those leaving the area are checked for possible contamination initial re-entry into the area is accomplished by A rad EOD team and the firefighting team other teams remain at the control point until they are needed the rad EOD teams precede the firefighting team and approach the area from the upwind side their objective is to map a safe path to the scene so that other response Personnel can move in when they encounter hazards they are clearly marked and their location is recorded [Applause] this information is relayed to the controller at the on scene control point where a master chart is plucked the task of surveying monitoring marking and Reporting continues until a route to and from the scene is clearly defined upon reaching the accident the fire chief deploys his equipment to cope with the remaining fire and any secondary fire started by the detonation of the weapon [Music] the rare DOD teams fan out from the accident and complete detailed monitoring of the area around and downwind from the scene upon completion of firefighting radiological monitoring an explosive ordinance disposal operations personnel and vehicles are monitored as they leave the area through the onene control Point although contamination is unlikely a decontamination station is set up where when a broken arrow occurs nothing is left to chance damage recovery teams under the direction of the civil engineer move in to do whatever is necessary to prepare the area for future use future use that means at any time for at any time the operational Readiness of this base of your base may be the crucial Factor but operational Readiness demands continuous activity flying Towing refueling pre-flighting and transporting [Music] weapons during these preparations serious situations can develop from fuel spillage weapon malfunction Convoy mishap aircraft fire and there are many more possibilities but the possibility of an accidental fullscale nuclear detonation is for all practical purposes non-existent it must be planned but broken arrows accidents involving nuclear materials do happen without warning this will was one of them in 1959 if this happened in your base even though the weapon belonged to a tenant organization you would have to cope with it if your base did not have nuclear weapons but this resulted from the crash of a Trent aircraft you would have to cope with it if this happened off base and yours was the nearest installation again you would have to cope with it off base civil agencies will play an important supporting role when you plan make Provisions for indoctrinating them fire department and medical personnel civil defense and law enforcement agencies must have an understanding of nuclear accidents what you expect of it if one should occur normal crash rescue procedures are not enough but the procedures outlined in this film represent the most effective yet developed for both on and off base accidents do you have them can you carry them out right now think about that when you think about [Music] this for
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