BE AGGRESSIVELY SAFE

all pilots believe they're safe pilots but not all pilots are aggressively safe pilots the aggressively safe pilot reacts in a positive manner with safety considerations above all the aggressively safe program was initiated in an effort to eliminate our accidents the intent of the program is to promote positive reactions in potentially hazardous situations by doing something not just hoping that things will work out an example of being aggressively safe is the go-around the safe pilot understands that a go-around is a positive demonstration of good judgment however a go-around is a maneuver that you may be reluctant to initiate for several reasons it's a non routine maneuver you're concerned over the time delay and being cleared for another approach you're worried about having to go to an alternate going non routine and missing your scheduled turnaround and most pilots have a higher than normal ego which is generally good but can become a burden to the pilot who thinks a go-around implies he's not the world's best let's take a look at the industry record the 1975 IATA report stated there were 16 jet losses for the year and a large number of minor accidents which reflected a continuation of the same old problems the IATA report listed the accident occurrence by phase of flight and compared 1975 with the previous three years the blue represents 1972 through 1975 and the orange represents 1975 notice the sharp rate increase during the take-off fade the chart re emphasizes that the most hazardous phase of flight remains takeoff plus three minutes and landing minus eight minutes this 11 critical minutes of flight demands the greatest concentration and awareness from each member of the flight crew let's review several of the 1975 accidents our accident review is for the sole purpose of learning from the experience of others our objective is to learn not to criticize a TWA Boeing 707 crashed at 10:30 local time December 22nd 1975 while attempting to land at Milan Italy there were 113 passengers and nine crew members on board the weather received from the tower was runway visual range 150 meters icing fog invisible sky vertical visibility 100 feet an approach was commenced using the look-see authorization and normal call-outs were made down to 200 feet during the go-around runway lights were observed on climb out the captain stated let's take one more look at that I think huh a reluctant question the first officer replied yeah I think we had a very reluctant concurrence upon starting the second approach the tower transmitted the visibility RvR 100 meters the captain remarked to his crew members that our VR went down we begin this flight profile that the published minimums of 200 feet the aircraft continued the descent and at 150 feet the radio altimeter warning sound begins at 100 feet the radio altimeter warning sound ends shortly thereafter the following remarks are made in sequence nothing nothing nothing approach lights there it is right over the runway you're on the side go you're off the wrong way you're off the runway you're off the runway this was followed with sounds of power increasing and then sounds of impact the aircraft came to rest to the right of the runway and was turned approximately 180 degrees from the landing direction all of the landing gear and engines separated from the aircraft the forward fuselage section broke just after the galleys there were no passengers in this forward section the forward right door was closed to a vertical position and was inaccessible to the forward flight attendants and the engineer who tried to open it the door shone open here was opened by ground personnel well after the evacuation took place the same three crew members also tried to open the forward left door but could not the aisle way into the cabin was blocked by the position of the main fuselage the first officer could not remove himself from his seat due to a back injury the engineer and flight attendant a lifted the first officer out of the captain's sliding window all of the forward station crew members went out this same exit flight attendants II could not open the aft left door it was jammed flight attendant B also tried to open the door from the outside but could not flight attendant C and D tried to open the aft right door but it was jammed situation four unusable doors the cabin floor was distorted into a washboard effect flight attendant F was seated in the left rear aisle seat she suffered a broken nose and face lacerations the three aft crew members shouted to the passengers to move forward but the passengers primary concern was for their personal belongings and the aisle became jammed the flight attendants climbed forward over the left seats while still commanding the passengers forward they stated they could move very rapidly over the seats a good point to remember when the flight attendants reached the over wing area they removed the left window exits and directed passengers out the captain and flight attendants a and B re-entered the aircraft here assisted passengers out and obtained blankets and first-aid kits a former TWA crew member who was seated in the right / wing area removed both exits and initiated the evacuation flight attendant II who were seated in the last first-class seat row shouted to the passengers behind her to go out the window exits she and the forward seated passengers exited via the break in the fuselage flight attendants have been reminded that extra flight attendants on narrow bodied aircraft should sit in the over-wing exits load providing for all takeoffs and landings the major lessons learned from this accident are that being aggressively safe is respecting weather minimums being aggressively safe is respecting decision height and being aggressively safe is going to the alternate when conditions dictate an overseas national Airlines dc-10 with 11 crew and 128 passengers who were all company employees and primarily crew members was destroyed by fire during takeoff November 12 1975 at New York Kennedy Airport the active runway was - - right the captain requested and received 1/3 right however when a runway change is made a JFK Byrd hazard order states in substance that whenever a runway change is anticipated personnel will make a runway sweep to chase the birds JFK has one of the highest number of reported aircraft bird strikes in the world in the previous six months before this accident JFK had 31 reported bird strikes no runway bird sweep was made on 1/3 right takeoff was initiated on 1/3 right with a wind of 160 degrees at 8 knots the runway was wet v1 was 178 knots at about 160 knots the aircraft ran through a rising flock of seagulls immediate damage occurred to the number 3 engine and a fire started an abort was initiated at 169 knots during the abort number 3 engine fell off and the fire engulfed the right wing in making a left turn onto a taxiway to miss a blast fence the right main gear collapsed the aircraft came to rest alongside the ILS check the dc-10 has four door exits on each side of the aircraft the fire and smoke made number two and three doors on both sides unusable the slide failed at the number 1 left door leaving only the 2 rear doors and the number 1 right door usable there was heavy smoke in the cabin notice the evacuation taking place at the front right door although an additional crew members seated in the cockpit exited into the cabin the three operating flight crew members exited through the right cockpit window and down the escape rope the copilot and engineer received serious rope burns the evacuation of the 128th company employees and 11 crew was completed in less than one minute with no fatalities the points to consider from this accident are if a take-off or landing is made at a bird infested Airport at a runway has changed checked that a bird sweep has been done evacuations require aggressive leadership most all would agree that a successful evacuation requires the ultimate in professional crew leadership accomplished in an efficient Swift and aggressive manner to succeed in this accomplishment program your subconscious with your assigned duties step-by-step from the cockpit shut down through the evacuation follow your assigned evacuation duties and be prepared for unusable exits people problems and equipment problems a continental 727 crashed during takeoff at Stapleton International Airport at Denver Colorado on August 7 1975 during taxi out to runway 36 the tower transmitted to the flight reports of pretty stout up and down drafts and a shear line at two to three hundred feet these reports were from the two previous takeoff aircraft a high based thunderstorms located to the west of the runway on takeoff the aircraft encountered the wind shear line at 100 feet and experienced a drastic airspeed loss of 41 knots in just five seconds this is Stapleton's runway three six these lines taken from weather bureau drawings represent the surface wind flow at the time of takeoff the diverging arrows represent the direction of wind flow from the center of the thunderstorms notice the extreme variables of the surface wind directions and speeds generated by the thunderstorms notice that the aircraft went from a 12 knot crosswind at the take-off position to a slight headwind component to a direct crosswind to a 60-knot quartering tailwind component the aircraft crashed to the right of the runway and slid about 2,000 feet the engines could not be shut down the aircraft had four jammed exits which were the rear air stairs the two aft cabin doors and the front left door only two of the seven crew members assisted in the evacuation from the inside they were the two rear flight attendants the two forward flight attendants were both knocked unconscious the flight engineer attempted to open the cockpit door believed it was jammed and the three flight crew members went out the cockpit windows the captain later re-entered the cockpit window shoved the cockpit door open and assisted the injured flight attendants out there was no fire again a successful evacuation requires the ultimate in professional crew leadership accomplished in an efficient Swift and aggressive manner know and follow your assigned evacuation duties the NTSB accident report stated as the probable cause the aircraft's encounter with severe wind shear at an altitude and airspeed which precluded recovery to avoid getting into a like situation be aggressively safe our flight operations policy manual states avoid takeoffs and landings in severe wind shift conditions be aggressively safe our flight operations policy manual states allow an extra margin above stall speed when flying in squally conditions for possible wind shift an Eastern Airlines 727 crashed during an approach to John F Kennedy International Airport on June 24 1975 a thunderstorm pattern was situated generally north of the airport with one storm close in over the approach path to runway two to left ten minutes before the accident a Flying Tiger flight 161 a dc-8 landed on runway two two left after clearing the runway the captain reported to the tower I just highly recommend that you change the runways and land northwest you have such a tremendous wind shear down near the ground on final the tower responded okay we're indicating wind right down the runway at 15 knots when you landed the Flying Tiger captain said I don't care what you're indicating I'm just telling you that there's such a wind shear on final on that runway you should change it to the northwest the tower did not respond he then transmitted missed approach instructions to eastern 902 who had just gone around and asked was wind a problem eastern 902 answered affirmative eastern Air Lines flight 902 a Lockheed 1011 had abandoned its approach to runway two two left Eastern 902 re-established radio communications with Kennedy approach control and the flight crew reported we had a pretty good shear pulling us to the right and down and visibility was nil nil out over the marker correction at 200 feet was nothing approach control responded okay the shear you say pulled you right and down Eastern 902 replied yeah we were on course and down to about 250 feet the airspeed dropped to about 10 knots below the bug and our rate of descent was up to 1,500 feet a minute so we put takeoff power on and we went around at a hundred feet approach control asked Eastern 66 727 if they heard Eastern nine oh twos report Eastern 66 replied affirmative Eastern 66 was cleared for an ILS approach to runway two two left Eastern 66 replied okay we'll let you know about the conditions the captain remarked to the other crewmembers you know this is asinine the aircraft impacted 2,400 feet short and came to rest on Rockaway Boulevard there were 113 fatalities and 11 serious injuries the following information compiled from the three aircraft flight recorders shockingly portrays the effect of the 400 foot wind shear line the flying tiger dc-8 rate of descent more than doubled from 750 feet per minute to 1,650 feet per minute its airspeed changed from 154 knots to 137 knots in 10 seconds near full power was applied and the aircraft landed the eastern 1011 rate of descent increased from 750 feet per minute to 1215 feet per minute the airspeed changed from 145 knots to 121 knots in 10 seconds full power was applied for a go-around however the aircraft descended to just 75 feet above the ground and at that point was 120 feet below the glide slope a 10 11 was nearly lost at the middle marker the 727 accident aircraft rate of descent more than doubled from 675 feet per minute to 1,500 feet per minute the airspeed changed from 138 knots to 123 knots in a very short two-and-a-half seconds the NTS b--'s probable cause was encounter with adverse winds associated with a very strong thunderstorm contributing was the continued use of runway 2 - left when it should have become evident to both air traffic control personnel and the flight crew that a severe weather hazard existed along the approach path the IATA report stated there are not any new problems causing accidents then what's the answer to many of these accidents that are taking place it's doing something about a potentially hazardous situation by taking positive actions it's simply being aggressively safe