In the Year of the Pig (1968, contains graphic content)

Heat. Heat. Heat. Heat. Heat. Heat. Heat. Heat. Heat. Hey, Heat. it. It ra greatest. >> I would remind you that scripture tells us that blessed are the peace makers. I want to underscore the word makers. And it takes a lot of doing to make peace. It takes a good deal of hard work building like a mighty cathedral stone by stone, block by block. And I sometimes wonder why we Americans enjoy punishing ourselves so much. with our own criticism. This is a pretty good land. I'm not saying you never had it so good, but that is a fact, isn't it? Heat. Heat. I think the most significant aspect has been the suppression. of political activity who force the people to go underground and to um understand politics only as revolutionary struggle and not on a political struggle. In other words, you can only um have a chance to change the regime only by revolution and not by an electoral process or a democratic process. One of the most important things concerning Hokim is the fact that he spent so long years out of his country and that nevertheless he has the touch and feel of the peasantry of his country of the village for village life in Vietnam is the essential of the life of the nation. And I will just give you one anecdote to show you that connection. when he for the first time met a press gave a press conference in Hanoi in 1945 when he came for the first time as a leader of his nation in front of the public he said to the people there I can't tell you what you have to do but I can show it to you put his thumb on the table and said if everywhere where you put your thumb on the sacred earth of Vietnam there is a plant growing then we will succeed if not now. Now this is again one of the points where hope on one hand is a Marxist economist who knows the importance of the basic production and on the other hand a confusion scholar because what you have to have in mind to understand that idea of the thumb on the earth is a simple Chinese proverb a thumb square of planting rice. is more precious than a thumb square of gold. We are now in a very interesting place about a chimin because in this place which is now a laksmith a key maker was um 14 years ago the place where he founded uh and edited the paria the first newspaper he edited and in this very place the life of min change in my opinion where Ochimin who came in 1917 in Paris as a peasant an Asian peasant uh became really a revolutionary and an internationalist. He was born in a poor and little village at Kimlen near Vin a now destroyed city of center Vietnam. He was the son of a very poor man but a man who was a Mandarin, a literated man. And this man was condemned by the French because his nationalism and all the life of Achimin was directed by this very injustice of made to his father by the French col colonizers. In this family they were nationalist since the very beginning. He left Vietnam, went on a boat, uh landed at New York, at London, at Lav and after that in Paris was where he became a first a socialist, after that a communist. >> Went on over to the White House and it came back with the very tight round hand of Franklin Roosevelt. I want no French returned to Indochina, FDR. And I remember the excitement I felt that this was the probably the first clear uh US policy toward a Southeast Asian state. >> Now the thing that I think we fail to recognize is that Hochi men communist or whatn not is considered by the people of Vietnam and I'm speaking now of of millions in South Vietnam is the George Washington of his country. He's the man that they think threw off the French, the colonialism. Uh just as we had our 1776, uh they had theirs in the 1940s. Uh he also led an underground movement against the Japanese who had occupied uh Vietnam and the whole Indochina Peninsula during World War II. And uh whether we like him or not, whether we like uh uh the particular economic system or social system that he might develop or not, we must remember that he is indeed uh considered by many the peasants, the small people, the little people in South Vietnam and North Vietnam as the George Washington of his country. General Gracie was the principal British officer responsible for accepting the surrender of the Japanese in French Indochina south of the 16th parallel and those were that was his mission. Uh but after he arrived in Saigon with his troops, he found that uh the French uh were without means of maintaining law and order. And so he, as I understand it, as I recall it, he took the weapons that he derived from the Japanese and turned them over to French uh military officers and men. If this had not been done, uh, in all probability, the French could not have recaptured their control at Saigon. I met Ho Chim for the first time in Hanoi at the end of 45 sent there by Darju Admiral Dju high commissioner sent by the Gaul in Saigon wanted me to contact the Vietnam leader for the first time. I said to him, I am sent to you by the high commissioner in the name of General Doul to tell you that we want Vietnam to join us in the French Union looked at me and he said the French Union, what's that? Is it a circle or is it a square? That was a test. You see, because there is a Chinese proverb, a lot of Chinese proverbs which identify heaven and intelligence with the circle and earth and solidity with the square. Is it an idea or is it a fact? Is it somewhere? And so I answered and I think that it's one of the occasions when has been just a little surprised. I answered, I don't know. He said, but what are you doing here? I come to ask you because we have to build it together. >> Towards the end of November of 1946 when the admiral commanding the French fleet in the Bay of Tonkan in his words decided to teach the Vietnamese government a hard lesson and the fleet stood off of H Highong and shell the city until between six and 10,000 were were killed. He said, "I have no army." It's not true now. I have no army. 1945. I have no finance. I have no diplomacy. I have no public instruction. I have just hatred and I will not disarm it until you give me confidence in you. Now this is the thing on which I would insist because it's still alive in his memory as in mine. For every time Ho Chi Min has trusted us, we betrayed him. Here you had a country which was not really just divided at the 17th parallel. um you had fought the Indochina War and all the best and most talented Vietnamese of a generation had faced in 1946 and 1947 the alternative of the French or the Vietn the best of a generation the kind of young men who would you know join up the day after Pearl Harbor in this country it was going to are you going to fight to kick out the French or are you going to you know be a French uh puppet so the most talented people of the generation all signed up and the Vietmen won this war and it was an enormously popular national war and at the end of it they came up with a dynamic society which had won a war which was tested which was tough which had brought up to the top the very best of a generation. >> Well, there are some similarities between the French effort in the Indochina war in Vietnam and the Americans. The Americans are just so much more powerful than the French were. They have so much more artillery. They have so much more uh air power. They have so many more men. They have so much more wealth uh than the French ever had. So that there are not going to be any DNB foos uh in the American uh presence there in Washington. The US Secretary of Defense >> the equipment which we have sent to Indochina is highly technical. So we are sending technicians as a temporary training force. We are sending planes but no pilots. We are not sending combat troops. We have seen no reason for the abandonment of the so-called Navar plan. That plan, as you may recall, broadly speaking, was a two-year plan and contemplated a very substantial buildup of local forces and their training and equipment. >> The French moved into Dian Bianfu in 1953. In January of 1953, parachute battalion came into the area and the idea was there were two aspects of it. One to control the piece of ground and then to prevent the Vietmen from sweeping on into Laos. I do not expect that there is going to be a communist victory in Indochina. By that I don't mean that there may not be local affairs where one side or the other will win victories. But in terms of a communist domination of Indochina that I do not accept the probability. The French generals did not believe that artillery could be brought to bear insufficient quantity. So correspondingly they were not active in their patrolling outside of the particular perimeter. The feature was to keep the focus on the area not to cause the quick rush of the battle position but to build the particular battle position. The French miscalculated, as I think did we, in the degree of sophistication of the weaponry that was deployed on the high ground. They didn't think he could get these pieces up there, but they did somehow. >> The battle of Denbian Fu is a significant phenomenon in military history. And from all of the standpoints that one views war, it achieved a particular political objective in the full Clausowitzian sense of the term. It represented a tremendous logistical effort on the part of the North Vietnamese or of General Zap to move the artillery pieces which changed the balance of this particular battle significantly. Forces of aggression seem to be concentrating just at one point at Dean Ben Fu where the existence is extremely gallant against overwhelming odds. >> The French began the war as a colonial war. They try many times to change this very nature of the war. trying to change it in a civil war, a war between the the right and the left in Vietnam and after that in international war, a crusade against communism. >> It was clear that the French were in deep trouble at Yenbin Fu. And then Admiral Radford thought that if we went in with air, we could knock them out. Senator Morton, uh, as you know from my letter to you, uh, we are very interested in a meeting that was called by Mr. Secretary Gulos and Admiral Ratford in which you played a part and in which eight members of the Congress of the United States were present, five senators and three representatives. I wonder if you could give us your best recollection of who was at that meeting. >> Senator Morton, sound one, take one. There was a meeting. I've forgotten the exact date. This can be easily ascertained. I assume that their records have been kept. The burden of it was uh Admiral Radford's feeling that we should really move in and bring active support uh to the French specifically uh air support from carrier based uh from carriers. Uh carriers were available in the nearby area. How many missions could have been mounted? I don't know. I didn't get into the military details and it was felt that the artillery that they had on the high ground uh could be destroyed by air attack >> and they failed always because they were always seen by the Vietnamese as a foreign power trying to get back his colonial power. That is why they lost the war at Yenfu. Dean Benfu has fallen. I join with you in paying tribute to the gallant defenders. May it be given us to play a worthy part to defend the values for which they gave their lives. The defense of Dean Benfu of 57 days and nights will go down in history as one of the most heroic of all time. The defenders composed of French and native forces inflicted staggering losses on the enemy. >> In Jop's treatment, Jop's uh writing about this uh he it appears that he was well ready in in Dian Fu. He was ready uh to if he had chosen to assault and did not some 8 weeks before the final movement took place. And I would submit that the reason for this is that that [ __ ] and uh Hochi men understood the political nature of this particular battle and they wanted the politics, the public opinion in France and in the rest of the world among the other powers to build to give this a great deal more uh importance than it had militarily. I think the American people this fall when they elect a Congress, all of the congressmen, onethird of the Senate, regardless of whether they're going to vote Democrat or Republican, should ask those senators and congressman said, "Well, mister, if we send you to Washington, are you going to continue sending American money to nations which in turn shift the sen of economic and military strength to red China, which is running the war in Indochina, keeping in mind that if we lose Indochina, Mr. Jenkins, we will lose the Pacific and we'll be an island in a communist sea. >> Situation in the area as we found it was it was subject to the so-called domino theory and that meant that if one nation went then another nation would go and so on. We're trying to change that so it won't be the case. That's a whole theory of collective security. agreement between the commanderin-chief of the French Union forces in Indochina and the commander-in-chief of the People's Army of Vietnam on the sessation of hostilities in Vietnam. Signed to Geneva, July 20, 1954. Article 14. Pending the general elections which will bring about the unification of Vietnam, the conduct of civil administration in each regrouping zone shall be in the hands of the party whose forces are to be regrouped there in virtue of the present agreement. Article 16 with effect from the date of entry into force of the present agreement. The introduction into Vietnam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel is prohibited. Article 18. With effect from the date of entry into force of the present agreement, the establishment of new military bases is prohibited throughout Vietnam territory. >> We support the objectives that are involved in this thing because it was done in the Eisenhower administration in 1954. We were not signers of the so-called class B treaty or convention at Geneva, Switzerland, but we did make a formal and solemn pledge that we were going to safeguard the independence and the freedom of Vietnam. Now, we can reneg if we like, but what will happen to our credibility in the world if we take that course? Every day someone jumps up and shouts and says, "Tell us what is happening in Vietnam and why are we in Vietnam and how did you get us into Vietnam?" Well, I didn't get you into Vietnam. You've been in Vietnam 10 years. Saigon was in a state of civil war. The rebel bin Xuan movement tried to incite the people to overthrow the government. In 36 hours non-stop fighting, 500 were killed, more than a thousand wounded. Vietnam Premier DM was still in office when we received these pictures. Unfortunately, the West does not agree about Saigon. General Healey on the spot commander for France is instructed to oppose DM. Malcolm Macdonald has flown there reportedly to do the same whereas America stands behind Premier DM. Meanwhile, Saigon suffers the agonist of civil war. In Khan is the absentee emperor Baai. First reported deposed, Baai may stage a comeback. As it is, Vietnam seems ripe for communist invasion. Jam I said before was the ban of the hour. Why? Once colonialism came to an end through the victory of the Vietnam against the French at the end and through the agreement in Geneva. This trend in Vietnamese history, which favored the communists exclusively, could be broken. Since colonialism, the creator of communism, so to speak, was now dead, there was a chance that other forces might be able to compete with Ho Chi Min. However, under certain conditions, they had to be as nationalistic as Ho Chi Min. They had to be free of the taint of collaboration with the French. They had to be the opposite of puppets of colonialism. Now, Kim was precisely that man. A lot of it was rather skillfully done in public relations. I think there's no doubt about that. Uh there was sort of a cult of the little fellow in the shark skin suit and the little mandarin who's going to stop the reds. And there was a a great many articles along this line, you know, sort of negoti. You have exemplified in your corner of the world patriotism of the highest order. You have brought to your great task of organizing your country the greatest of courage, the greatest of spansship, qualities that have aroused our admiration and make us indeed glad to welcome you. I thank you very much. >> Part of my involvement with Vietnam was to be active in founding the so-called American friends of Vietnam, a private organization dedicated to the promotion of understanding, spread of information and support of KM. I was in fact more or less uh running the organization as chairman of the exe executive committee. The American Friends of Vietnam was a lobby group set up I think about 1955 uh really to lobby for the the Goden Zam regime in this country. And I think the particularly interesting thing about it was it was uh so much of it and so many of its more more distinguished names were liberal names. People like Max Learner and Arthur Slesinger uh a senator John F. Kennedy people like that. And this gave of course the ZM government a very good liberal umbrella. I mean the the sense the sensitivities and the sensibilities of many liberal people who might otherwise have been dubious about that regime uh were eased off that the ZM regime got right from the start I think the benefit of the doubt. It is understand that the interest of the Vietnam are identical with the interest of the people of free world. It is on this plan. It is on this plan that your and our fight is one and the same. We too will continue to fight communism. >> It is not. It may be really repeated here. There is no two Vietnams. There is only one Vietnam temporarily divided in Geneva in 54 between a free zone with a North Vietnam and an occupied zone occupied by the French. But and the French had still after Geneva the jurisdiction of over South Vietnam because they could not hand it over to a regime which did not exist is not even mentioned in the Geneva agreement. The regime of Saigon is only a temporary one in waiting for election. The refusal was amply justified, if only because the kind of election envisaged by the Geneva Agreement of 1954, a free election could not have been held. Anyone who thinks that a free election was possible in communist North Vietnam knows little of how communists operate and could have fallen into a Moscow peeping trap. The United States could not agree today any more than in 1956 to legitimizing communist control of all Vietnam by a device of a communist style election. And you ought to have sat with me on the foreign relations committee in 1956 when our intelligence forces brought in their reports warning that if the election called for by the Geneva Accords for July 1956 were held, Ho Chi Min would be elected president in South Vietnam by at least 80% of the vote. And our country that boasts about believing in self-determination used its power and its prestige and its influence really to get our first puppet government under GM not to cooperate in holding those elections. That's just a matter of historic record. As you know when not Zim and new uh were finally uh killed in 1963 some 50 to 60,000 and we the the precise number is not readily available but some 50 to 60,000 uh political prisoners were released from prisons in South Vietnam subsequent to this uh elements of the rotating governments that followed the death of Zaman new have indicated ated that most of those people were not Vietkong sympathizers in any way, shape or form. Which ind would indicate that all political activity that was antithetical to Yemen new was met either with murder in the south or imprisonment. And from 1958 we see the existence confirmed by some American experts and some broadcast from man of a national front for liberation of South Vietnam. It was in fact a confederation of all the forces who for years were struggling against the ZM regime and it was not as it has been said too much and too often the political arm of Anoi. The National Front for Liberation included the former remnants of the political religious sex ka and how the bins 2, the former Vietmin, the Democratic Party, the radical socialist party and various other elements who are united in the common aim to overthrow the regime to create a coalition government, democratic regime in the south in order to be able to discuss with the north uh the provision of Geneva. That means the end of the occupation regime in the south and uh peaceful reunification between the two parts of Vietnam. >> U the front is not what you would call a puppet of Hanoi. The two organizations and I do stress that they are two organizations worked very closely together. Many of their aims are parallel aims uh but their ideas do not always coincide and indeed sometimes their policies are in conflict. Land reform was a total failure. There were sporadic attempts to try and deal with land, but they never had any real support from ZM. What he did was that he gave to the 1,200,000 tenants, some land. Actually, he didn't give it to them. He sanctioned the fact that the Vietmin had given it to them but he made them pay for it. No, the uh downhill trend of the DM regime is best uh described by the increase of corruption, by the increase of the influence of a near psychopath like his brother New and his wife Madame New, both of whom had a drive for power which I can only describe as pathological. I had once dinner with them and N told me, "You see, we could have an opposition in Vietnam if I led it. But since I am the only intelligent man in South Vietnam, all my mental capacity goes into leading my brother to rule South Vietnam. I have nothing left to organize an opposition." Now this kind of conceit is of course pathological. However, this man gained more and more influence over DM together with his wife. >> This this is the kind of psychology you had in a turbulent changing Asia. I mean this old sort of Mandarin idea, you know, that I am right. I have this almost this divine right to rule. How can you challenge what I say because I am incorruptible? Staley bought the strategic hamlet from New uh brought it out as a new little goodie and no pun intended, but came up with a strategic hamlet and this amounted to the same old approach of forced relocation, the living behind bars, the total regimentation of the social and the fabric of the society. One of the more significant things about the strategic hamlet is that they were physically and literally demolished by the Vietkong after Yemen knew were killed. They every stick was taken down. They and the every piece of wire and the enemy took this off to make use of it and told the people return to your ancestral homes. And at that time they began to take control effective control over the countryside. Uh ZM was corrupted on vanity and power. Uh knew on on his own ego. Madam knew certainly on power. She was the one who really understood what they were doing the most. She was the most realistic one. She had no illusions about them. That she was a smart, strong, dynamic woman. No illusions about herself. And she tended to to set policy. She she knew what they wanted. She didn't worry about what the Americans were saying, you know, be nice, do this nice popular thing. The important thing to her was the survival of the family. And anybody who got in the way of the survival of the family uh was a threat. In this affair, I do not think that we should worry too much because we have the same fate. Whatever is happens in my country, we shall not feel it alone. You also you will feel it. >> The base of ZM was his army which was American supported and American aid coming through and this the police u force and and generally an increasingly police state uh technique. But there was no disscent. they controlled the the legislature which was a rubber stamp and uh >> about the question of rubber stamp parliament. I have repeatedly said, "But what wrong to understand the laws we approve?" >> A major policy paper issued by the State Department in n in December of 1961 stated flatly, and I quote, "The years 1956 to 1960 produced something close to an economic miracle in South Vietnam. It is a report of progress over a few brief years equaled by few young countries. End quote. >> It has been said by Confucious wonderfully well. He said never have laws to precise because the precision of the law gives the possibility to get around it. Have laws that are built by governments which are reliable, which know you, which are close to you. And this is how in the organization of the Vietnamese society the village was so essential. And I think that this has been the great mistake of an to replace the leader of the village who was the expression of the country the expression as they say of the wind and the water of the of the locality. He replaced that by appointed village chiefs. Now when the Vietkong assassinated village chiefs, they were not at all village chiefs but people who were not belonging there and it was a scandal to a village that were them there. And so when the Vietkong assassinated so many of those people and I am not a man who likes to hear that people have been assassinated and some of them might have been very good people. The majority might have been acceptable if they had been the expression of the village. But at the very point where the Vietnamese nation, the Vietnamese earth rises and speaks to the government through the not chiefs through the representatives of the village, the elders of the village at that very point where the life of the country is. Rodinium put simply a wet blanket of functionaries just at the point where was the life of the country. He brought the extinguishing methods of a government which was not a government for the Vietnamese. Well, one of the uh very significant events uh toward the end of the DM regime which indicated the degree of uh decay particularly in the morale of the army was the battle of APAC. It indicated that militarily the DM regime was unable to handle the insurrection and it brought about the discussions in Washington which eventually led to the decision to put in our own troops and not only our equipment. >> I think the vice president's journey represented a great public service. There are members from both parties uh here today to greet him. There were members of both parties in his group uh going around the world. This was an American effort to indicate our great concern for the cause of freedom in in significant and important countries uh around the world. We visited in several countries where the population would add up to more than 3/4 of a billion people. We didn't see all of those people, but we saw a good many of them as well as their leaders. We never heard a hostile voice and we never shook a hostile hand. When uh Vice President Johnson, which was also part of the 61 arrangement, when he came to Vietnam, he announced a series of things that the United States was going to do. And this is when we made a fundamental change in our policy. I can remember Bernard Fall in 1962 interviewing Fam Van Dong, the prime minister of North Vietnam and talking about the American aid and Fam Van Dong was sort of saying, "Oh, poor ZM. Poor ZM. He is unpopular." And because he is unpopular, the Americans must give him aid. And because the Americans give him aid, he becomes less popular. And because he gives he becomes less popular, the Americans must give him more aid. And because they give him more aid, he becomes even less popular. And Bernard F interrupted and said, "That sounds like a vicious circle." And Fan Vang Dong paused and said, "No, not a vicious circle. A downward spiral." I'm Roger Hillsman. I was director of intelligence and research in the State Department under John F. Kennedy and then assistant secretary of state for far eastern affairs under Kennedy and for a while under President Johnson. The most dramatic was one day in Saigon when a Buddhist parade started off with a sort of a hypnotic chant. uh the yellow robe priests uh marching along and then there stepped forward a very a frail old man in his 70s who turned out to be this uh priest uh Kwanduk and he assumed the lotus posture and another priest stepped forward and uh poured gasoline over him but I don't think anything really gives the flavor or the fever of that time other than to point out that when this monk burned himself Nagodian's ZM really believed that American television networks had staged this. They had paid the Buddhists to stage this burning for their own benefit. I mean, after all, the Americans were ZM's allies. And then suddenly, a towering flame and what was in the and the priests and the nuns in the audience moaned and prostrated themselves towards this burning figure. and he sat there unflinching and the smell of gasoline and of burning flesh in the air for 10 minutes. The political effects of this were enormous. It was so dramatic. It hit the headlines all over the world. It had enormous political consequences uh outside of Vietnam and inside of Vietnam. uh people uh thought they saw the face of Buddha in the clouds that night. >> People have spoken very much about the the monks who burned themselves. But those monks who burned themselves burned themselves because they were incited to do it. >> The American idea which was that uh sink or swim with God didn't seem as colleague Homer bigot had coined the phrase. I think the idea of that was well that he had become an expendable man. The American policy had always been that he was you know he was the only man we had. Uh Johnson had called him the Winston Churchill of Southeast Asia which a unique tribute to Mr. Churchill. Uh and so I think that with this they had changed the American policy view of them that that they were they were expendable. And what happened was of course the coup did take place on that day in November and they were murdered. And it had taken place in an atmosphere where the Americans who had in a sense created this regime who had given it what little sustenance it had whose invention Nagoden Zim had really always been had withdrawn because after all the VC were about to take cities without even a fight. I mean the the VC were running rampant over the countryside. The strategic hamlet program was really finished. It didn't exist. It was not so much that the Americans had aided the coup or created it, but as they had given all their aid to Zam, they had moved back and they had said, "No, we just support the anti-communist effort." Uh, it wasn't that they were on the side of the others, but they were no, they made it very clear that they would stand aside. And with that, they spelled the final end of that regime. Heat. Heat. Heat. Heat. Heat. Heat. Heat. Heat. Heat. Heat. Heat. Heat. Heat. Heat. Now, we've gone in on the assumption, this is the myth, that a friendly government has asked us to come in and prevent a takeover or what friendly government? That government has changed half a dozen times since that time. It changes from week to week. No one knows just what the government is. I am very much impressed by the military and economic and the social programs instituted by General Khan. I appreciated also the opportunity to talk with the chief of state, General Men. In other words, you you cannot defeat the communist without the support of the people. And to have this support, you must bring justice to the people. In other words, equality and freedom. >> How do you achieve this now? >> Justice. Justice. Banish corruption. give to the people uh higher standard of living and make them feel free. >> Would Kennedy have done what Johnson has done? There were two things that he very very much wish to avoid. One was making this an American war. As he used to say, it's their war. of the South Vietnamese. We can give them aid. We can even give them advisers, but they must win it or lose it. And I think he was fully prepared to let them lose it rather than make it an American war. He felt that if we put Americans in there, it would drive with their white faces, it would drive communism into the nationalism into the arms of communism. The second thing he wished to avoid was internationalizing the war, as we called it. By this we meant bombing the north or attacking the north first and foremost because it would not work. And here 30 some odd months of bombing has shown that his judgment was right. >> I think that u uh there's great danger in this country uh because of the fact that so much of our economy is geared uh in the military area. There is grave danger of uh a military industrial alliance of a kind uh actually affecting policy. Now, uh, Vietnam is a case in point, uh, not the only place because we're spending $50 billion a year outside of Vietnam for military. And, uh, I do think that, uh, having dropped more bombs on Vietnam than were dropped by all the Allied powers in World War II in tonnage on that small country. I mean, it to me, it's just how silly can you get? present. H. I think communist aggression must result in communist disaster. And I don't think you're going to get that at the conference table. And the world is watching us in Vietnam to see if we'll put our money where our mouth is. It's just that simple. And I just wish that uh uh we would decide to win the war and that we would step out and close the port of Hiong and hit every military renumative target over there. And I think you're a better chance to bring the communist to the conference table uh than if we do not hurt them. >> However, American instinct makes us want to jump in with both feet and get an unpleasant job over with as soon as possible. But traditional oriental patience makes them willing to carry on the struggle into generation after generation if necessary. We're fighting a war over there with a commodity most precious to us and held far more cheaply by the enemy, the lives of men. I don't think it's necessary to have an invasion of North Vietnam. And it would be just exactly what the enemy wants. He'd like us to put down a 100,000 men in a field and they put down 100,000. They're willing to lose half of theirs. And ours is a precious commodity. And I wouldn't trade one dead American for 50 dead Chinamen. >> We must fight the war from our strength, not the enemies. We must fight at least cost to ourselves and greatest cost to the enemy. We must change the currency of this game from men to material >> right now. What is the greatest single problem we're facing in Vietnam? >> Well, it's the despicable communist enemy. No question about it. And the sooner we smash him, as we should have done in Korea, if we' done it in Korea and our first test of arms with communism, we wouldn't be confronted, I don't think, with the situation we have in Vietnam. >> You have respect for the Vietkong. Do you think they're a good soldier? >> Well, there's no question about it. They're willing to die readily as all Orientals are and their leaders will sacrifice them. Uh and we won't sacrifice ours. >> The only solution I see is to use our strength, our air naval power in the most humane possible manner possible to destroy North Vietnamese capability to wage war against the free people of South Vietnam. So I think the sooner that we hit everything we can and hurt them over there, we got a better chance to win that war. And that's exactly what we should do in my opinion. So the harbor at H Highong and the entire capacity to receive outside help close it. The power system that fuels every wararm making facility. The transportation system, rails, rolling stock, bridges, yards. Eliminate them. Every factory and every industrial installation, beginning with the biggest and the best, and never ending so long as our true brick still stuck together. and if necessary the irrigation system on which food production largely depends. We must be willing to continue our bombing until we destroyed every work of man in North Vietnam if this is what it takes to win the war. Then there was a little crisis there. uh the military thought that there was a great infiltration and Secretary McNamera went out and came back and said no there wasn't a crisis at that time but I thought it was very significant that President Johnson then appointed a committee to prepare a list of targets in the north in case he should decide to bomb the North. The more I thought about this, the more I became convinced that if there were a crisis, he would escalate the war. This is part of the steady escalation that's taken place uh during the last five years. Uh first we sent in only advisers. Then it developed these advisers were also in combat. Then we sent in the Marines and the first thing was said that they were there only to defend. And the next thing was that they would shoot back if attacked. And now uh there is an admission that there we're all in. Some others are eager to enlarge the conflict. They call upon us to supply American boys to do the job that Asian boys should do. They ask us to take reckless action which might risk the lives of millions and engulf much of Asia and certainly threaten the peace of the entire world. A second deliberate attack was made during darkness by an undetermined number of North Vietnamese PT boats on the USS Maddox and the USS C Turner Joy while the two destroyers were cruising in company on routine patrol duty in the Tonkin Gulf in international waters some 65 miles from the nearest point of land. >> They put out that propaganda, but they got caught because we were able to disclose within two days that if they would check upon the log of the Maddox, for example, they would find she was only 11 to 13 miles from the bombing of those islands. And of course, that's coverage. And the North Vietnamese knew that it was coverage. Do we do our uh naval vessels afford any cover for the for those operations? >> Our naval vessels afford no cover whatsoever. >> Now the sad fact is history will record that the United States was an aggressor in Tonkan Bay. We're violating the rights of North Vietnam. Had no right to proceed on the second day to ourselves bomb uh North Vietnam. the areas where her torpedo boats were kept. But we had a duty that wasn't self-defense. Bombing bombing North Vietnam was not within the right of the president to act in self-defense of the republic. My duties on board the sea plane tender were a nuclear weapons officer. On August 4th, there was an alleged attack upon the USS Maddox and Turner Joy, two of our destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkan. The destroyer personnel indicated at first that they were under attack and later indicated uh uncertainty as to whether or not they were under attack. Large numbers of torpedoes were supposed to have been uh fired. The ship was uh reporting itself as continuously maneuvering to avoid torpedo attack. And yet there was also indicated in these messages doubt as to whether or not they were under attack at all. And I have a feeling therefore that this harassment attack and this attack with 20 or more torpedoes upon two of our destroyers was designed to uh force us out in a way lest we precipitate a greater struggle. I have a feeling that they've misread America once again. >> In the course of our conversation, this chief petty officer told me that he was a sonar man on board the USS Maddox, and that he had been in sonar, the sonar room, during the attack. He told me that in his estimation, there were no torpedoes fired at the ship or otherwise during that alleged attack. And furthermore, he constantly repeated this uh sent this information to the commanding officer on the bridge. >> The North Vietnamese have no submarines. What is the purpose of that movement? >> This is purely precautionary so that the fleet will be prepared for all eventualities. >> What sort of eventuality, General? >> Well, possible submarine attack. >> By whom? >> By anyone. Well, you always contended that in the first incident they were having. >> I'm I'm contending that having the the Maddox and the joy there constituted in view of the knowledge as to what the South Vietnamese boats were up to an act of constructive aggression on our part. The Vietnamese situation, as I noted on my visit back home last week and this week, has taken on some real spirit and real interest. And I thought perhaps a statement by the joint Senate House Republican leadership would be timely and quite in order at this moment. as a result of what we have done in South Vietnam. Not only has the psychology changed there, but also it has had a most beneficial effect in my opinion among other free Asian countries who looked at South Vietnam as a test. >> Okay, today today's the day. It's the big one. >> This is the one we've been waiting for. This is the one you've all been saying to yourself. What this company needs is a good fight. By the grace of God, we're going to get it. From there, we're going to SND search and destroy the thing you guys like. Okay. Some of you, I know this is going to be a shock to you, but it's a switch for old Alpha Troop. We're riding in and we're not riding in on one of those dusty old APCs. We're going in first class. TWWA, Teeny Weeny Airlines. >> Well, search and destroy uh is an attempt to, as the the first word would indicate, to find the enemy, to search out where he would be, and then to destroy him in his habit. >> Okay. >> West of the stream and uh east of the road. Roger. Last five. How much rice do you think is actually in there? >> Oh jeez, I don't know. About 20 tons, 10 tons. >> How far back does it go? It's about 30 by 15. Anyways, about 12 ft deep. Come on, little man. How do you destroy this much rice? >> Yeah, the demo man usually blows it up. >> You're going to blow it up, are you? >> They can't get it out. They'll blow it up. It's uh it's unmilled rice. Oh, look at that. Here's all the detachment consists of two double rotor Chinook helicopters. The Chinooks usually are cargo or troop carriers, but not these. They're gunships. Do the prisoners that uh we've captured or have been captured say that this is the most feared weapon outside the B-52s. That is because the amount of ammunition we carry, the very types of weapons, and the amount of time we can stay on station. At the present time, we have on this a 140 mm grenade launcher, two 20 mm cannon, five 50 caliber machine guns, and two rocket launcher pods consisting of 192.75 rockets. Uh we usually carry inside two additional M60 machine guns and ammunition for them. And occasionally the crew rat holes a few things that they don't tell us about till they're airborne. Uh >> we work at it. We can unload in about 20 to 25 minutes, but we are in danger of burning out barrels, which we frequently do. I was amazed when I came to this outfit of how accurate the 50 caliber were. I figured they would be known more of an area spray weapon, but they can actually walk those weapons right down the tree line. Now, the 20 mm is, of course, very, very accurate and has quite a range. We can start firing with this machine 4,000 m away, which is considerable distance. The one I fly is known as birth control. Heat. Heat. You look like you enjoy your work. Why? >> Well, I've been doing it for 36 months since I've been in the service and uh it's the type of work I enjoy outside moving around. >> But this particular operation, the Cedar Falls, why are you enjoying this? >> Well, I think we're benefit by clearing all this area. It's the first time they've got a push on like this and hadn't walked off and left it. They're completely just going out ahead and pushing on forward instead of walking off. >> Where'd you find these people? Uh they live right in this area here in the village of Dong Men between here and the railroad out to the west. >> Why'd you bring them in here? >> We've had so much trouble when we moved through this area and a lot of civilians killed as a result of this. And uh as we made our pass through here, we picked these people up and moved them with us into here so that we could make a careful sweep and probe each and every hut looking for tunnels and caves, uh possible VC hiding places. We found a few caves and uh blew them, picked up some weapons, killed a few VC. Uh, in the meantime, we're now going to sweep back through and go to the railroad and move back out to the west. >> What's going to happen to the people tonight? >> Well, the people, we're going to keep them right here. We've got some chow farm and some water and we'll feed them and uh you'd be surprised how they can take care of themselves here with with a minimum of resources and they take care of these children here during the night and uh they huddle real close together and they'll keep warm. >> Now, how long are you going to hold on to these people? Well, around noon tomorrow as we move back out to the west and uh then these people be released to go back to their to their own huts to cultivate their rice or harvest their rice and continue their normal activity. >> Now, you got some BC suspects out of this group, didn't you? >> Uh yes, we just helifted five suspects out of here back to the battalion rear CP to be further interrogated. >> How did you select them? >> These are Chu Hoy people and Vietnamese interpreters that we have with us. They've been in this area two or three years and uh they know these people and from talking to them they get some ideas. Maybe these people know a little more than they're telling us and we take them back to get a little higher echelon of interrogation down at Hoyan or or Denbond. Some of these people come back to us even and we'll put them with our companies to sweep these river banks. It's hard to know just who a VC is unless unless he's carrying a weapon or a cartridge belt or some grenades or something. A person just walking along, you don't know if he's a VC or not might be in this crowd. But uh then some of these people that have operated with the VC and if they defect and come over and uh we can use these people as scouts and they go along the river banks with us and they look just like anybody else. But when they have a weapon uh then they're free game. >> How did this man get killed? >> Well, he threw grenades at the Marines and instead of just one, he threw three and the Marines spotted him and started shooting at him and that's how he got it. Two big holes by his eye and throat were done by 306 sniper rifles. All the rest of the holes are done by this new type of uh rifle we got, the M16. >> How about all these people who are standing behind me over there? Uh do you think any of them know this man? >> Yes, they do. But uh they wouldn't admit it because uh they're afraid that we're going to take them back to CP for questioning and uh we'll detain them under this RVN program where they'll teach them propaganda for 3 months. They hold them for 3 months. That's why they won't admit they know this man here. >> We've put over about 3 million of them into what I would call a concentration camp. They call it a refugee center. It's got barbed wire around it. They can't get out of it. Taken these people from the graves of their ancestors from their rice patties. And we say, "Oh, well, we've pacified x million people." Yeah, we pacified some more people by putting them in these camps. >> I'll grind us up in a hurry. I know many people have said, "Look, we've killed innocent people. Our bombs have killed civilians and babies and mothers." And I suppose there is truth to that. There have been people that have been killed. But your government has not bombed civilians. Your government has not bombed open cities. Your government has sent its bombers in after targets, military targets that have been placed in an area surrounded by civilians. The unfortunate thing is that the enemy is quite frequently located in areas that have people who are not part of the military structure in an immediate sense. They may be sympathizers. They may be uh uh supporting through their efforts, their work and the like. But what occurs when you engage in a search and destroy is the destruction, the needless destruction of innocent human innocent civilians. Now, you might say that they're all part of the entire communist apparatus, but the feature is that if we are going to prevent this war from degenerating into a genocidal activity, then our attempt would be to to rehabilitate or to to wean those folks away from the communist rather than to destroy them. This is what search and destroy becomes in a very practical sense. Of course, uh they're the subject of our constant concern because they're such a magnificent group of fighting men. Their morale is extremely high. They always have a smile. I was at a very kind of sobering thing last night, a memorial service for four men in the second squadron who were killed the other day, one of them being a medic. And uh the place was just packed and we sang three hymns and had a nice prayer. I turned around and looked at their faces and they were I was just proud. my my uh feeling for America just soared because of their the the way they look. They look determined and and and reverent at the same time, but still they're a bloody good bunch of killers. When a captive is taken by United States or free world forces, he is f he is following interrogation uh turned over to the Vietnamese authorities. These prisoners are not being mistreated. They are being handled in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. The prisoners were were executed in uh our outfit as a as a standard policy. We were told by our CEO after our first battle that from then on we weren't going to take any prisoners. >> My name is John Toller. I'm a sergeant in US Army special forces known as the Green Berets. I'm in route to Vietnam. However, I'm deserting the army because I am protesting the US involvement in the Vietnamese conflict. Today, your soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coast guardmen are better educated than before, are better informed, have traditional American ingenuity and initiative, are better physical specimens, have higher morale, and understand what the war is all about. As I mentioned before about changing the minds of the apathetic populace, the key is to communication. And most of the American soldiers I know can't communicate. They don't really understand the Vietnamese way of life. And and it's its goal and uh the only way they can communicate is through money or with a gun. So after a while they they develop this kind of fear and so they a misunderstanding and a non-communication they they mistrust the Vietnamese and they kind of despise them. Once we got to Vietnam it was entirely different story. The the officers started referring to the Vietnamese as gooks. They even went so far as to say that uh the only good [ __ ] is a dead [ __ ] They said you can't trust them. You can't trust any of these slightly bastards because because none of them were no good. Actually, looks like this beach has just about everything. Is there anything that it lacks? >> American girls, I say. >> Well, there are girls down the other end of the beach, though. >> No off limits to me. >> They're goos. >> Yeah, >> you know, slanhide. They're no good. >> Who needs girls? >> Same same slope. Heat. Heat. Heat. Heat. Heat. Heat. I'm David Worfl, professor of political science at the University of Missouri and a specialist in Southeast Asian politics. I've spent about seven years in Asia teaching, researching, studying. As a matter of fact, I've written particularly about the problem of corruption and fraud in elections. >> Isn't it true though that the censorship now is going to be a little more rigorous as soon as the campaign starts? >> No, sir. I don't think so. >> But uh you have said, have you not, that the Vietnamese press should not criticize the candidates in the election. Why is that sir? >> Well, it's our formal and present policy. I don't think it's wise to allow people to use free press to you know issue critic criticism each other because it created more confusion more division among the people. The elections that were held in 1967 for national office of course in the first place could be participated in only by people living in so-called secure areas which excluded at least a third of the population that were in areas so thoroughly under the control of the NLF that the government couldn't even pretend to regulate affairs there. that we should call to the attention of the people that the folks that are doing the most to keep us from having a fair and free election in Vietnam today are the Vietkong and the North Vietnamese themselves. Now this is not to say that the campaign or the election in the south will go off without blemish. This is only to say that an effort is being made and a strong effort with our very strong support and endorsement to conduct an open election in a nation that's under fire from guerrillas and from terrorists and from aggressors and from invaders. And so, President Johnson being true to the origin of the elections in the first place was very much concerned about how the American people would would interpret these elections. And he saw that it was necessary to appoint an official observer team. But of course, most of the people had never been in Asia before. Almost none of them had ever been in Vietnam before. Very few of them even had any contacts in Vietnam. And so the theoretical opportunity to talk to anybody they wanted to uh simply could not be utilized. And in fact, most of those who talk to anyone except embassy people uh talk to those Vietnamese introduced uh to them by embassy people. voting officials, voters, everybody were on their good behavior because the American observers were there. So for them to have expected that they would see fraud with their own eyes was uh simply absurd. Furthermore, they left Vietnam within 24 hours after the polls closed. And in that period after the polls closed, they did not speak to a single Vietnamese. The possession of a clipped and stamped voting card, of course, was a very important protection for the Vietnamese peasant. It was almost as important as having his registration card. And anyone in Vietnam who does not have an official government registration or identity card is in deep trouble. He's immediately assumed to be a Vietkong is taken into the police station for questioning or worse. I saw even in Saigon uh in workingclass districts where on election day rather early in the afternoon the uh polling place ran out of vote uh ran out of uh ballots and there were people already lined up uh wanting to vote at this polling place. When it was announced that they'd run out of ballots, the the poor washer women and and workmen were fighting to death. Oh, we we've got to vote. We've got to vote. We've got to have our clipped uh voting card. So, uh in balance, we had a a government elected with little more than a third of the vote hailed by the United States Johnson administration as being a a popular and legitimate government. nearly two-thirds of the people voting against it and uh even that 35% of course being to considerable extent result of fraud and uh intimidation. I have my button. It was bad enough for uh the generals to get away with double voting and ballot box stuffing. But to have the American observers say that they thought it was all fine and dandy made Vietnamese very mad indeed. There were efforts to protest election fraud. There were student demonstrations and as a matter of fact, at one point it almost looked as if the election would be invalidated. What I think we've come to and what I think the tragedy of Vietnam clearly demonstrates is that we now find ourselves in a world in which the arrangements of power cannot yet be ignored, but in which the instruments of power no longer work. this if this lesson has been taught us in Vietnam, then the stubborn little gorillas out there who saw off the American giant at the knees and brought him down almost like David versus Goliath will have done a great service not only to their own cause, whatever one may think about it, but perhaps to the cause of world peace and perhaps most particularly to the Colossus himself. Maybe we needed to be brought up short. Maybe what we've been doing in Vietnam all along is an exercise in what Senator Fulbright has called the arrogance of power. We cannot retreat from any place. And I can tell you that we don't intend to retreat. We were asked by the state department to prepare a letter and send it to Hochi men through a channel which had been opened and was available to us. We were certain would deliver the letter directly to him. It was a very consiliatory letter written in the in the state department in consultation word by word with secretary Bundy, secretary Katsenbach and others in which we spoke on behalf this was the actual phraseology on behalf of high officials at the state department. All of Asia, free Asia as well as communist Asia is watching Vietnam. And if for example out of this present struggle after making this great commitment after turning around the psychology in Asia we then agree to a coalition government with the communist or we force the South Vietnamese into a neutralized position and neutralize it as we did Laos or if we make any kind of territorial concessions to the Vietkong. either one of these three courses of action would be interpreted as a retreat and also a defeat not only for South Vietnam but for the United States. >> We had an extended interview almost 2 hours with Hochi Men. It was perfectly clear in the course of that interview that Ho Chi Men was delivering to us certain information he expected us to deliver back to the state department. And on the side of Himin understand that first of all he will bring to the negotiation the prestige of an unparalleled life of devotion to his country in the history of this century. He will be the great patriot and be careful here. Don't forget that he is a Marxist and don't expect him to turn a traitor to the ideal of his life. He was unyielding on the point that the bombing had to halt before his negotiators would enter into any kind of substantive discussions. But I think he was trying to make the point making it repeatedly that after that the agenda was open. Now there may be those who say well obviously and you haven't offered them enough. Well, it's true that we haven't offered them South Vietnam and it is true that we have not agreed to assure them that we will stop the bombing on a permanent and unconditional basis. We discovered sometime later when the correspondence was made public by Hanoi that 4 days before our letter could arrive uh in Hanoi, a letter arrived there sent over President Johnson's signature which was a very hardline letter indeed which restated all the previous conditions regarding sessation of the bombing and even added some new ones and which was in our judgment intended to do what it did do which was to break off any possibility of negotiation at that time. This letter, we subsequently learned, had been written 2 days before ours was written in conjunction with the State Department. We found to our surprise and shock, I might say, that Haramman was already saying that he proposed to negotiate the settlement by suggesting that there had to be some reciprocal military action in return for the final sessation of the bombing. In other words, the same point that Johnson had been standing on before he made the speech of March 31st. It was almost as though Haramman turned off his hearing aid when we told him that this would not work. This was not the understanding the North Vietnamese had and they would certainly repudiate it if he attempted to take that position at the bargaining table. And this of course is what did happen at Paris. >> In the view of the North Vietnamese, the reciprocity means United States is bombing North Vietnam and North Vietnam must bomb United States. This in their view is reciprocity since North Vietnam is not bombing the United States. The United States should not bomb North Vietnam. >> The general impression that um I came away with and I think here I would speak for my colleague Bill Bags was that we were dealing with the State Department on a basis of what we have come to call Fulbright's law. will never trust the State Department. >> Bombing is going on in the south. We haven't bombed anybody's embassy in Hanoi, but they've bombed our embassy in Saigon. Arms continue to flow. Men continue to come. We've tried in all over the earth to find an answer to the question, what else would stop if the bombing stopped? The nicities of the argument about whether there are two Vietnams or one Vietnam seem quite inconsequential when you're talking to Hochi men. It would seem incredible that this man does not speak for most of the Vietnamese. Not all, but most. And the idea that there could be some arbitrary geographic dividing line that would cut off his influence has been proved an absurdity by the figure and determination of the National Liberation Front that fights in his name in the south. >> My name is Olivia [ __ ] I'm a journalist on the non-communist liberal left-wing French paper. I first went to South Vietnam when escalation started in 1965 and I first went to North Vietnam at the end of 1967. Uh I'm Harrison Salsbury of the New York Times um assistant managing editor of the Times. I'm Father Daniel Beran. Uh I'm working here at Cornell teaching and helping with the peace movement. It's about 1 month since I was in North Vietnam on a project to get the three American flyers out. At the time I went to North Vietnam, the communicates which were being issued by Washington in particular about the American bombing raids on the north gave the impression although they did not say so specifically that we were not killing civilians in any substantial numbers at least in the course of our very heavy bombing offensive. Uh indeed President Johnson himself said that the targets were steel and concrete. I think almost anyone familiar with war would have been somewhat skeptical of the ability to bomb such precision. And indeed, when I got on the spot in North Vietnam, I discovered, of course, that while the bombs presumably had been aimed toward military objectives as best the aviators could aim them, they indeed did kill many civilians, demolished large areas of civilian housing. Before I left for North Vietnam, I was under the impression that it was a small country that was just sort of vaguely fighting back. But after seeing many battles against American planes from the banks of the Red River, I changed my opinions completely. The anti-aircraft in North Vietnam in certain pack pockets, as the American pilots say, is absolutely formidable. It's a sort of fourlevel affair. You have uh people equipped with submachine guns and rifles shooting at a first level, forcing the planes to go up to a second level where there they come against the machine guns, a lot of them being Chinese. And then they're forced up to a third level which is that of the ordinary guns, most of them I would say Russian. And after that they go up to a level where they meet the SAMs. And I would been told that these SAMs were antiquated. Well, in fact, they're not. They're formally powerful. During one week in October, I saw at least 11 planes in 5 days being shot by the North Vietnamese anti-aircraft defense. When you walk about the streets of Hanoi, you are struck by the fact that you constantly see civilians going about in trucks uh with gunshots with guns strapped to their back. It's unusual to see so many people with guns in their hands. And it's most unusual to see this in a communist country. One evening on the road to Hiong, we were bombed 300 yd from where we were and with my interpreter, we immediately went uh onto the side road. I was very frightened. I was terribly frightened. But as soon as we bumped into a machine gun nest, fear disappeared and the government has understood this and I think this is one of the reason why it has armed most of the population. We went into the countryside and we saw great evidence in the cities as well that the people are generally armed. The civilian militia is very large. The women share for instance the burden of anti-aircraft, gunfire, defense of the city. We saw large numbers of men and women on the roofs of buildings preparing uh in the early stages of air alarms for the bombardment itself. And they said to us quite openly on several occasions, look, one of the most practical evidences of the truth that this government speaks for us is that the government has armed us to the point where if we wanted, we could bring the government down in a day and they themselves know this. >> At the time that I was in North Vietnam, there obviously had not been any breaking of the morale of the people either in the cities or as far as I could observe out in the villages. Although they had been subjected to an extremely heavy bombardment at that time it was reaching the levels of World War II and of course since that time has been much much strengthened. The people of North Vietnam are young for the most part and the war effort is largely on the backs of teenagers not because they're running out of manpower but because this is is a young country. >> There is nothing that has not been attacked. There is no thread that has not been tried to be burned or frayed or broken by us. And yet none of it has happened or it's been repaired in the night. >> Altogether I think one can say objectively that there isn't a town left standing apart from Hiong and Hanoi. >> So that there are hospitals, there are schools, there are there is a trusted government and there are there there are political leaders whom they don't hesitate to call loved and admired. which is to say the war is not working. It's a very simple judgment, too simple for the complexities of our power. Uh perhaps in a deeper spiritual sense, too too tough to face because it means the end of the giant. It means the last days of Superman. It means that for those with the capacity of overkill, kill is not enough. Um, the real thing required is to live in the real world. As Booer says, it is to be able to imagine the real world and imagine human beings. And as long as the dinosaur couldn't do it, he ended up on the museum shelf. And as long as Superman can't do it, he can raven and destroy. But he cannot give life. And he cannot even truly, as we know so bitterly, he cannot live himself. The North Vietnamese always insist that they are winning this war, that they are not simply resisting. And when I talked to Prime Minister Fam Van Dong, he said, uh, we are not underbombing, we are facing the bombs. And at first I thought that this was mere propaganda, but seeing the North Vietnamese fighting in the country and in the towns, I think that psychologically it is true. I was most interested to find that when I got to Hanoi, the uh authorities uh put no restrictions on what I wanted to send out. Prime Minister Fam Van Dong stressed in his talk with me the parallel between the ancient struggles of the Vietnamese people against the Chinese, the Manchu and the Mongols and their contemporary struggles for independence which began of course under the French many years ago were continued without interruption through World War II then resumed again the French and are now being carried on against the Americans. Prime Minister Fam Van Dunk turned to me at one point and said, "Mr. Salsbury, how long do you want to fight? Would you like to fight for 10 years, 20 or 30? You pick the term of yours. We're ready to accommodate you." A rather bold statement. And maybe it was had some bravado in it. But this is again in accordance with the spirit of the Vietnamese people. >> There's no one in that society who doesn't remember hunger in his own lifetime. And it was interesting that from the peasants to the young intellectuals when you pose the very same question that is to say what has the revolution meant first of all to you you'll get the same answer. We now have enough to eat as simple as that. So that when the North Vietnamese government makes it its pledge of honor that the rice bowl will be filled. This is so great a thing that we can hardly conceive of it. It just seems to be off our radar. I I think you know for them the question is first of all a very very concrete one that statement is literally true and then again it it it begins to to move into the larger areas. the the circumference of the bowl expands and and you note that the revolution has meant a passion for education, a passion for grassroots involvement in their own future, their own social structures, their own politics and that at the other end of that power which they are trying to move upward after so many many years of colonial powerlessness. At the other end of that power is standing a man who also has a rice bowl in his hand and whose poverty is equivalent whose power has not separated himself from the fate of the majority. Who can move in the same cheap cotton clothing and with dignity among them and whose power is not an inferior backroom game or a game of marked cards under a table or a corrupt double talk such as we've gotten so used to in the in the chanceries of the West. Yet there is one light of hope and this is that throughout Vietnamese history they had catastrophes. They had Chinese, Mongolians invasions where whole provinces were destroyed because you know you are not the first people who destroy villages in Vietnam unfortunately. And so they are used to that and it's a great tradition that the village is not lost even when it disappears from the surface of the ground because the village is down below down below with the tradition down below with the people the ancestors who have made the country literally the country is handmade. There is not one square foot I would say a square thumb of the earth that has not been built as it is by the peasantry in the past. And this survives and when will it after 100 years a village comes back the descendants of a village come back to the village they find the village and the village starts in. Hey